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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and
photographic analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch,
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video
Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment
of the mission.
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Shuttle Mission STS-62 was launched at 8:53 a.m. local 3/4/94
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1.0 Sugary
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 2 March 1994. The detailed walkdown of Launch
Pad 39B and MLP-1 also included the primary flight elements
OV-102 Columbia (16th flight), ET-62 (LWT 55), and BI-064
SRB's. There were no significant facility or vehicle anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded on 4 March 1994 after a one day
delay due to unfavorable weather predictions. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside of the
established data base and no IPR's were taken.
Although acreage icing on the External Tank was possible due to
an ambient temperature of 45 degrees, winds averaging 8 knots
and relative humidity of 81 percent caused only frost to form
on a mostly condensate-free tank. Patches of frost were visible
on the L02 tank barrel section and the LH2 tank acreage.
After the 8:53 a.m. launch on March 4th, a debris inspection of
Pad 39B was performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were
found. Damage to the pad overall was minimal. The GH2 vent
line was latched properly, came to rest on the eighth tooth of
the latching mechanism, and had no loose cables.
A total of 149 films and videos were analyzed as part of the
post flight data review. No major vehicle damage or lost flight
hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. No
stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. All T-0
umbilicals operated properly.
On-orbit photographs taken by the flight crew and two films
from the ET/ORB umbilical cameras of the External Tank after
separation from the Orbiter revealed no major damage or lost
flight hardware that would have been a safety of flight
concern. Intertank foam, 14 inches long by 4 inches wide, was
missing from a stringer head forward of the left bipod spindle
housing closeout. Approximately 3 inches of primer was exposed.
A small divot appeared just aft of the left bipod spindle in
the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. No other divots were
visible in the flange closeout. The bipod jack pad closeouts
appeared to be intact. A divot, 5 inches in diameter, occurred
in the LH2 tank acreage adjacent to the +Y side of the cable
tray. The divot went to substrate and exposed the primer.
Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. Infrared
imagery of landing gear deployment showed the loss of thermal
barrier from the nose gear wheel well. The missing thermal
barrier material was not recovered%
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after
retrieval. Both frustums had a combined total of 44 MSA-2
debonds over fasteners. Significant amounts of BTA had been
applied to closeouts on the RH frustum, forward skirt, and aft
skirt. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas were
the BTA had been applied. The underlying BTA was not sooted
(IFA STS-62-B-I). Investigation of this condition concluded
there was insufficient heat rates to cause blistering of the
Hypalon until late in the ascent phase. Testing has shown that
Hypalon paint blisters burn off rather than become detached
debris sources.
The LH frustum upper left BSM cover was bent backward to the 90
degree position and the attach ring had been deformed/fractured
by parachute riser entanglement. The upper right BSM cover had
rotated 20 degrees counterclockwise when the set screw holding
the BSM in position was overloaded by parachute riser entangle-
ment. The HDP #8 DCS plunger had been pushed back into the
plunger housing, but was not obstructed by frangible nut
pieces. Although launch films showed no debris falling from the
DCS/stud hole at lift off, post flight disassembly of the
Debris Containment System revealed a retention of only 77
percent. The ordnance fragments may have been lost at water
impact.
A post landing inspection of OV-102 was conducted after the
landing at KSC. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 97 hits,
of which 16 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger. The
Orbiter lower surface had a total of 36 hits, of which 7 had a
major dimension of 1-inch or larger. Based on these numbers and
comparison to statistics from previous missions of similar
configuration, both the total number of debris hits and the
number of hits 1-inch or larger was less than average.
The largest tile damage site measured 10" x 2.5" x 0.675",
involved four tiles, and was located five feet forward and five
feet inboard of the RH main landing gear wheel well leading
edge. The damage site was not that large initially but appears
to have originated from four distinct impacts enlarged by
erosion during re-entry. The remaining tile material in the
damage site showed no significant glazing.
A cluster of 29 damage sites spanned three tiles on the rudder
black edge tiles (left side) along the hinge line below the
split in the speed brake. Six of the damage sites had a major
dimension of 1-inch or larger while three of the damage sites
were deep enough to expose the substrate. Three small hits
occurred in this same general area on the right side of the
rudder/speed brake.
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Six thermal barriers, total size approximately 36" x 3" x 1.5",
and one corner tile piece 4" x 4", were missing from the nose
landing gear doors. Runway infrared cameras recorded these
objects falling from the Orbiter when the nose landing gear
doors were opened on final approach.
A search of the area under the flight path failed to recover
the missing thermal barriers, which may be submerged in the
large body of water south of the runway. The cause for the loss
of the material was attributed to the way the substrate was
prepared for bonding at the vendor.
Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a
variety of residuals in the Orbiter window samples. These were
attributed to SRB BSM exhaust, Orbiter TPS, window protective
covers and processing, natural landing site products, and
paints/primers from various sources. The residual sampling data
do not indicate a single source of damaging debris and all of
these materials have been documented previously in analyses for
post landing sample reports. Data from residual sampling also
showed no trends when compared to previous mission data.
A total of ten Post Launch Anomalies, including one IFA, were
observed during the STS-62 mission assessment.
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2 . 0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Ice/Debris/TPS/Photographic Analysis Team briefing for
launch activities was conducted on 2 March 1994 at 0815 hours.
These personnel participated in various team activities,
assisted in the collection/evaluation of data, and contributed
to reports contained in this document.
B. Davis
G. Katnik
P. Rosado
R. Speece
B. Bowen
K. Tenbusch
J. Rivera
M. Bassignani
J. Blue
Z. Byrns
J. McClymonds
W. Atkinson
R. Hillard
S. Otto
J. Burney
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
LSOC - SPC
NASA - KSC
RI - DNY
RI - LSS
MTI - LSS
MMMSS- LSS
LSOC - SPC
Debris, IR, Photo Analysis
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
Chief, ET Mechanical Systems
Lead, Thermal Protection Sys
ET Processing/Ice/Debris/TPS
ET Processing/Ice/Debris/TPS
Lead, ET Structures
ET Processing, Ice/Debris
ET Processing
Level II Integration
Debris Assess, LVL II Integ
Debris Assess, Integration
SRM Processing
ET Processing
Safety
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3.0 LAUNCH
STS-62 was launched at 94:63:13:53:00.009 GMT (8:53 a.m. local)
on 4 March 1994 after a delay of one day due to unfavorable
weather predictions.
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/P/%D DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 2 March 1994. The detailed walkdown of Launch
Pad 39B and MLP-1 also included the primary flight elements
OV-102 Columbia (16th flight), ET-62 (LWT 55), and BI-064
SRB's.
Three areas of damaged CPR, the largest estimated at 2 inches
by 1 inch by an unknown depth, were detected on the LH2 barrel
-Z side near the aft hard point during the $6444 Pre-Launch
L-20 Hour Debris Walkdown (PR ET-62-TS-0020) . Although the
damage appeared to be caused by some type of impact, possibly
from a bird, lack of access at the pad precluded further
assessment. The condition was accepted for flight by MRB.
A secondary sound suppression water trough missing from the RH
SRB exhaust hole was replaced prior to cryoload.
3.2 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 4 March 1994 from 0340 to 0525 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
44.7 Degrees F
81.1 Percent
8.13 Knots
260 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
as shown in Figures 1 and 2.
3.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS
thruster paper covers were intact though the F2U cover had been
wetted by internal vapors. Ice/frost accumulations were present
at the SSME #i and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. An
infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the
base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields, though a cold
spot was visible inside the SSME #1 nozzle.
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3.4 SOLID RDCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the PSTI/Cyclops spot
radiometer ranged from 45 to 53 degrees F. The SRB GEI measured
temperatures ranging from 49 to 54 degrees F. All measured
temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement.
The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied
by MTI was 66 degrees F, which was within the required range of
44-86 degrees Fahrenheit.
3.5 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run
from 0100 to 0845 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3.
The program predicted ice/frost formation or freezing runoff
condensate (Region III) on the TPS acreage surfaces after
cryoload.
The Ice Team observed no ice accumulations on the L02 tank
ogive. Frost had formed on the barrel section +Z side. There
were no acreage TPS anomalies. Surface temperatures as measured
by the infrared radiometer averaged 33 degrees F on the ogive
and 32 degrees F on the barrel section. In comparison, SURFICE
predicted temperatures of 33 degrees F on the ogive and 29
degrees F on the barrel.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Typical
ice/frost accumulation, but no unusual vapor, was present on
the ET umbilical carrier plate. Scattered and isolated frost
spots appeared on the splice plate closeouts. The radiometer
measured a surface temperature of 48 degrees F.
There were no LH2 tank acreage TPS anomalies with the exception
of the three small damage areas near the aft hard point
detected during the Pre-Launch Walkdown. The areas, which were
small cavities believed to have been caused by a bird, were
filled with ice/frost but were not an ice or debris concern due
to size/location. Frost, but no ice, was present on the acreage
+Z side. Heavier accumulations of ice/frost had formed over
areas of thin foam, on the longerons, and along the edges of
the PAL ramps, cable tray ramps, and pressurization line ramps.
The portable STI measured surface temperatures averaging 32
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 26 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank. In comparison, SURFICE predicted temperatures of 26
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 34 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank.
The bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with
adjacent foam.
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A 14-inch long by 3/8-inch wide crack in the -Y vertical strut
cable tray forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout
interface was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria
and required no IPR.
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline
bellows and support brackets. Frost was present on the L02 feed
line acreage.
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/
frost covered sections of the umbilical acreage. Ice/frost
fingers on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents
and cable tray drain hole were typical.
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows and portions
of the feedline straight section were frost covered.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical purge barrier. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed
on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost was
present on the aft pyrotechnic canister closeout bondline
indicating a thermal short. Ice/frost had formed from the
17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam plug forward
corner to the aft pyro canister closeout. No unusual vapors or
cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish,
and launch.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which
were all acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria,
consisted of six OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented frost accumulation on the L02 and LH2
tank acreage with the most prominent accumulation in the +Y+Z
quadrant. The frost melted after sunrise prior to T-0.
Anomaly 002 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the L02 feedline support brackets and bellows.
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical, pyro can purge vents, purge
barrier, and LH2 recirculation line bellows/burst discs.
Anomaly 004 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical, purge barrier, and pyro can purge
vents.
Anomaly 005 documented a crack 14-inches long by 3/8-inch wide
in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS. The
crack exhibited no offset and was not filled with ice or frost.
Anomaly 006 documented ice/frost accumulations in damaged foam
areas adjacent to the aft hard point (PR ET-62-TS-0020) .
ii
3.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch (LCC requirement).
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals, the GH2 vent line, or the GUCP. Somewhat more than
usual amounts of ice and frost covered the LH2 T-0 umbilical
purge shroud and parts of the carrier plate.
No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the GOX vent
hood was retracted. No icicles had formed on the GOX vent ducts
12

Areas of damaged/crushed CPR foam near the aft hard point were
assessed and found to be no constraint for cryogenic loading
and flight. The impact-type damage may have been caused by a
bird while the vehicle was undergoing preparations for launch
at the pad.
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The largest area of damaged/crushed CPR foam, estimated to be 2
inches by 1 inch by an unknown depth, filled with ice and frost
after cryogenic loading. The condition was acceptable fo_
flight.
14
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\Light frost, but no ice or significant amounts of condensate,
were present on the External Tank acreage after cryogenic
loading. The frost melted shortly after sunrise.
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IFrost, but no ice, covered the acreage areas of the LH2 barrel
+Y+Z quadrant, longeron closeout, L02 feedline, and L02 ET/ORB
umbilical.
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Frost, but no ice, had generally formed on the L02 tank barrel
+Y+Z quadrant. There was no ice or frost in the "No Ice" [egion
on the nosecone and ogive.
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Some ice/frost had formed on the L02 feedline support brackets.
Frost also accumulated on the feedline acreage. This condition
was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
18
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A crack, 14 inches long by 3/8 inch wide, appeared in the
forward surface of the -Y ET/SRB cable tray after cryoload. The
crack was not filled with ice or frost and exhibited no offset.
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!Ice/frost covered parts of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical acreage and
the outboard side of the purge barrier (baggie) . A small frost
ring formed on the cable tray drain hole.
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\Ice/frost on the LH2 feedline and recirculation line bellows
was typical. The formation of frost on the feedline straight
section between the bellows was not typical. The condition was
acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the ET/ORB LH2
umbilical including ice/frost fingers on the plate gap and pyro
can purge vents. The 17-inch flapper valve access port TPS
plug showed no signs of purge gas leakage or ice formations.
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the Mobile Launch Platform, Fixed
Service Structure and Rotating Service Structure was conducted
on 4 March 1994 from Launch + 1.5 to 3 hours.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found.
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP shoe EPON shim
material was intact. Twenty percent of the HDP #i sidewall shim
material was missing. There was no visual indication of a stud
hangup on any of the south holddown posts. All of the north HDP
doghouse blast covers were in the closed position. The SRB aft
skirt purge lines and T-0 umbilicals exhibited typical exhaust
plume damage.
A 4.5 inch long by 1 inch diameter bolt was found underneath
the sound suppression pipe near the southeast corner of the LH
SRB exhaust hole. A metal shim measuring 12 x 8 inches was also
found under the sound suppression pipe near the north west
corner of the RH SRB exhaust hole. Both items originated from
the sound suppression pipe support stanchion at the north end
of the LH SRB exhaust hole. Several other shim pieces were
loose at this same location. Time of failure was not evident
from hardware condition or film/video review.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA), and GOX
vent arm showed only minor damage.
The GH2 vent line was latched on the eighth tooth of the latch-
ing mechanism, had no loose cables (static retract lanyard),
and appeared to have latched properly with no rebound.
Damage to the facility included an unused telephone box
dislodged from a mount on the FSS 95 foot level. A damaged
overhead speaker on the 275 foot level was suspended only by
safety cables. This damage probably occurred after the vehicle
cleared the tower and is not considered a debris threat.
Debris inspections of the pad acreage, beach, and areas outside
the pad perimeter were performed. No flight hardware or TPS
material was found.
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 9.
23
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the s<_ui_d s_ippression pipe near the southeast corner of the LH
,-q[z_ _=:-:ha_Lst h.ole. A metal shim meas_tinq 12 inches by 8 inches
was also found near the NW corner of the Pdd SRB exhaust hole.
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The bolt and metal shim originated from the sound suppression
pipe support stanchion at the north end of the LH SRB exhaust
hole.
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5.0 FILM REVIEWAND PROBLEM REPORTS
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the
Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems
engineers. No In-Flight Anomalies were generated as a result of
the film review. Post flight anomalies are listed in Section 9.
5.1 LAUNCH FILMANDVIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 106 films and videos, which included forty-one 16mm
films, twenty-one 35mm films, four 70mm films, and forty
videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have affected the mission.
SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile
appeared normal (OTV 151, 170, 171). Ice/frost was visible at
the SSME #2 nozzle-to-engine mounted heat shield interface
(E-19, 26).
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during engine
start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous
launches (E-76, 77).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. Some pieces of ice contacted the umbili-
cal cavity sill and were deflected outward, but no tile damage
was visible (OTV 109, 163).
Ice particles from the L02 feedline upper bellows fell outboard
of the EO fitting (E-5). Ice from the EB fittings impacted the
RH aft BSM nozzle, but no vehicle damage was visible (E-9) .
Surface Coating material was lost from base heat shield tiles
outboard of SSME #3 (3 places) and near SSME #2 (4 places)
(E-17, 18, 20).
No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. No
ordnance fragments or frangible nut pieces fell from any of the
DCS/stud holes. A 12" x 2" piece of red tape appeared between
the HDP #5 shoe and the aft skirt foam after T-0 (E-12).
The LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected properly. Two thin
rectangular objects fell from the L02 T-0 umbilical prior to
T-0. The first object, most likely a parts tag, appeared at
13:52:55.514 GMT. The second object, appearing at 13:52:56:446
GMT, was identified as a piece of ice (E-17, 18).
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GUCP disconnect from the External Tank was nominal (E-33). The
GH2 vent line appeared to latch properly (OTV 104, 160, E-41,
42, 50). There was no excessive slack in the static retract
lanyard. Post launch inspection found the GH2 vent line latched
on the eighth tooth of the latching mechanism.
A more than usual amount of MLP deck scale and SRB throat plug
material passed in front of the camera as the vehicle was
leaving the field of view (E-5, 7, 9).
Numerous light-colored debris objects, most likely SRB throat
plug material, appeared out of the SRB flame trench north of
the vehicle and moved in a southerly direction toward the
vehicle. The objects fell back down into the flame trench well
short of the MLP north side (OTV 160, E-60).
Sunlight reflected off the crew cabin windows and the LO2 tank
pressurization line near the nosecone during the roll maneuver
(OTV 141, TV-4B, TV-7).
The F2U thruster paper cover, which was wet prior to launch
from internal vapors, tore and fell aft during the roll
program. No vapors indicative of a leak were visible coming
from the nozzle (E-54, 213).
Hydrogen fire detection butcher paper came off the ET vertical
strut and fell past the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical at 13:53:12.919
GMT (E-57) .
LO2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier (baggie) fell aft of the
vehicle during the roll maneuver at 13:53:14.293 GMT (E-52).
One of the large, oblong paper covers from the forward RCS
thrusters first appeared near SSME #I and fell aft (E-213,
frame 2128 and E-222 at T+27.985 seconds MET).
All SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield closeout blankets appeared to
be intact and missing no material.
A large flash occurred in the SSME #I plume at approximately
T+52 seconds MET (TV-4B). Numerous flashes occurred in the SSME
plume during ascent (E-207, 218, 220, 222, 223).
Body flap movement (amplitude and frequency) was similar to
previous flights (E-207, 220).
A vapor cloud near SRB plume at 13:53:56.7 GMT was associated
with atmospheric conditions and was not related to vehicle
performance (E-211, 224).
Numerous SRB propellant particles or pieces of aft skirt
instafoam fell out of the plume during ascent (E-220, 222).
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Exhaust plume recirculation and ET aft dome charring appeared
typical. SRB separation from the ET was nominal. Numerous
pieces of slag dropped out of the SRB plume before, during, and
after separation.
The SRB frustums separated from the forward skirts properly.
Parachute deployment and reefing appeared normal though a rip
was visible in one main chute on the RH SRB. Function of the
chute was not affected (E-301, 302).
28

The LO2 T-0 umbilical disconnected from the Orbiter properly. A
rectangular object (arrow), most likely a parts tag, fell from
the carrier plate at 13:52:55.514 GMT.
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One of the large, oblong paper 'covers from the forward RCS
thrusters passed over the wing and first appeared near SSME #i
at T+28 seconds MET. Although RCS paper covers typically tear
into smaller pieces in the airflow, this cover remained intact
while falling aft of the vehicle.
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew. Thirty-six hand-held
still images were obtained of the ET after separation from the
Orbiter. 0V-102 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: 16mm
motion picture with 5 mm lens; 16mm motion picture with 10mm
lens; 35mm still views. The 16mm camera with the 10mm lens did
not run. Data was obtained from the other two films.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have been a safety of flight concern. Review of the
on-orbit photography resulted in no IFA candidates.
External Tank intertank foam, 14 inches long by 4 inches wide,
was missing from a stringer head forward of the left (-Y) bipod
spindle housing closeout. Approximately 3 inches of primer was
exposed. A small divot appeared just aft of the -Y bipod
spindle in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. No other
divots were visible in the flange closeout (+Y+Z and -Y+Z
quadrants).
At least 35 shallow "popcorn" type divots were visible on the
+Z side of the intertank acreage in the vicinity of the bipods.
A divot, 5.5 inches in diameter but shallow in depth, occurred
in the LH2 tank acreage just aft of the LH2 tank-to-intertank
flange closeout between the +Y bipod spindle housing closeout
and the L02 feedline support bracket (XT-II29) .
Both bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and appeared to be in
excellent condition.
A divot, 5 inches in diameter, occurred in the LH2 tank acreage
(XT-1590) adjacent to the +Y side of the cable tray. The divot
went to substrate and exposed the primer.
The L02 feedline lower support bracket splice plate closeout
(XT-1973) exhibited a 4 inch by 3 inch divot.
Foam was eroded/missing from the +Y thrust strut flange
closeout.
The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition with
the exception of foam peeled back on the inboard surface of the
umbilical near the forward inboard pyro canister closeout. The
red purge seal was intact. Blistering of the fire barrier
coating was typical. Frozen hydrogen adhered to the 17-inch
flapper valve. Foam was missing or eroded from the vertical
section of the cable tray and the LH2 feedline outboard support
bracket.
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Foam on the forward inboard corner of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical
appeared slightly damaged. Numerous divots and eroded areas
were visible on the horizontal and vertical sections of the
cable tray. The red purge seal was intact though discolored by
excess white RTV near the electrical monoball. The lightning
contact strips on the umbilical were all present and intact. A
debris object, possibly a shim or piece of tape, was visible
inside the electrical monoball at the 2:00 o'clock position.
After ET separation from the Orbiter, a light colored,
flexible, 4-6 inch long object appeared to originate from the
Orbiter ET/ORB umbilical area, move past the External Tank
crossbeam and LO2 ET/ORB umbilical area, and drift aft out of
the field of view. The object is believed to be a piece of
white RTV.
SRB separation from the ET and External Tank separation from
the Orbiter were nominal.
The BSM burn scars on the L02 tank were typical. No anomalies
were observed on the nosecone, L02 tank acreage, PAL ramps, RSS
antennae, flight door, bipod ramps, L02 feed line, and aft hard
point. The aft dome NCFI acreage was charred, but showed no
erosion or divots. Erosion/ablation of the manhole cover
closeouts and aft dome apex, which is an expected occurrence,
was also typical.
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Separation of the Solid Rocket Boosters from the External Tank
appeared nominal. Small pieces of foam fell aft passed the
camera field of view. Erosion of TPS on the LH2 feedline
support bracket and charring of the ET/SRB vertical strut aft
surface was typical.
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Separation of the External Tank from the Orbiter appeared
normal. Foam was peeled back from the inboard surface of the
LH2 ET/ORB umbilical near the forward inboard pyro canister
closeout. The red purge seal appeared to be intact. Frozen
hydrogen adhering to the 17-inch flapper valve was typical.
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Foam ©n t inboard corner of the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical
appeared slightly damaged. Numerous divots and eroded areas
occurred on the horizontal and vertical sections of the cable
tray. A debris object, possibly a piece of shim or tape, was
visible inside the electrical monoball at the 2:00 o'clock
position.
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Intertank foam, 14" x 4", was missing from a stringer head
forward of the left bipod spindle housing closeout. Primer was
exposed. A divot appeared between the L02 feedline and the
right bipod closeout. The bipod jack pad closeouts were intact.
A 5-inch diameter divot with exposed primer occurred in the LH2
tank acreage (XT-1590) next to the cable tray.
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5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SU_I_ARY
A total of 40 films and videos, which included six 16mm films,
nine 35mm films, and fifteen videos, were reviewed.
Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. Infrared
imagery of landing gear deployment showed the loss of thermal
barrier from the nose gear wheel well. The missing thermal
barrier material was not recovered.
The Orbiter was slightly east of the runway centerline when
crossing the threshold but drifted and appeared centered for
main gear touchdown. Contact of left and right main gear was
almost simultaneous. Somewhat abrupt excursions west across the
runway centerline occurred twice before the drag chute was
deployed. Some rudder/speed brake movement was also visible
during this time.
The drag chute was deployed after breakover, but before the
nose gear contacted the runway. Drag chute deployment appeared
nominal. The chute was blown slightly westward (+Y side of the
Orbiter) by prevailing winds.
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth.
Damage to lower surface tiles near the RH MLG wheel well was
visible.
A study was conducted for the astronaut office to determine the
altitude of the Orbiter crossing the runway threshold using
photographic means and compare the result to flight computer
data. A 35mm Photosonics motion picture camera was positioned
in line with Runway 33 threshold line. The camera was located
at least 600 feet away from the runway centerline such that all
surfaces on the Orbiter were assumed to be perpendicular to the
camera. Film analysis determined the lowest point on the
Orbiter (right main landing gear tire) was 28.94 feet above the
runway surface. In comparison, the Orbiter flight computer
showed an altitude of 23 feet above the runway when crossing
the threshold line.
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Film analysis determined the Orbiter right main landing gear
tire was 28.94 feet above the runway surface. In comparison,
the Orbiter flight computer showed an altitude of 23 feet above
the runway when crossing the threshold line.
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 8 March 1994 from 0830 to
1030 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in good
condition.
6.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The RH frustum was missing one 2" x 2" area of TPS near the
BSM's and had 23 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. Significant
amounts of BTA had been applied to closeouts on this frustum.
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing from areas where the BTA
had been applied. The underlying BTA was not sooted except
along the 395 ring aft of the BSM cluster. The soot pattern
indicated some of the blisters may have formed prior to SRB
separation (IFA STS-62-B-I) . Investigation of this condition
concluded there was insufficient heat rates to cause blistering
of the Hypalon until late in the ascent phase. Testing has
shown that Hypalon blisters burn off rather than become
detached debris sources. The BSM aero heat shield covers had
locked in the fully opened position though three of the attach
rings had been bent by parachute riser entanglement (Figure 4).
The RH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact.
Significant amounts of BTA had been applied to closeouts on
this forward skirt. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing from
areas where the BTA had been applied. The underlying BTA was
not sooted. No pins were missing from the frustum severance
ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were
generally in good condition. Trailing edge damage to the FJPS
and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, IEA covers, and stiffener rings
appeared undamaged. A 7"xl" area of K5NA was missing from the
separation plane/forward side of the upper strut fairing and
the substrate was sooted. The aft booster stiffener ring splice
plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. Aft
skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition. Significant
amounts of BTA had been applied to closeouts on this aft skirt.
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where the
BTA had been applied. The underlying BTA was not sooted.
The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated
and appeared to have functioned properly. EPON shim material is
no longer bonded to the HDP #3 and #4 aft skirt structure.
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RH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing TPS.
Blistered and/or missing Hypalon paint mark the areas where BTA
had been applied as a closeout material.
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Significant amounts of BTA had been applied to closeouts on the
right forward skirt. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing from
the areas where the BTA had been used but the BTA was not
sooted or charred.
Oi..,l'.'J pACE
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|Overall view of the aft booster/aft skirt. Separation of the
aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The struts, ETA ring, IEA,
IEA cover, and stiffener rings appeared undamaged.
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Aft skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition. Hypalon
paint was blistered and/or missing from the areas where BTA had
been used as a closeout material but the BTA was not sooted or
charred.
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6.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum was missing TPS in one area (3"x2") near the -Y
axis/275 ring frame and had 21 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners.
There was virtually no blistering of the Hypalon paint with the
exception of minor localized blistering along the 395 ring. All
BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened
position. However, the left covers were bent backward and the
attach rings had been deformed/fractured by parachute riser
entanglement. The upper right BSM had rotated 20 degrees
counterclockwise when the set screw holding the BSM in position
was overloaded due to parachute riser entanglement (Figure 5).
The LH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact,
though the -Z antenna base plate had delaminated. Minor
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ET/SRB attach
point and on the systems tunnel cover. No pins were missing
from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good
condition. A 1-inch debond occurred on the forward factory
joint of the aft segment at 45 degrees. In general, minor
trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEI cork runs were
attributed to debris resulting from severance of the nozzle
extension. Small, but more than usual, areas of missing paint
on the SRM cases were most likely caused by nozzle severance
debris.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, IEA covers, and stiffener rings
appeared undamaged. The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts
were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. Aft
skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition. Hypalon
paint was blistered over areas where BTA had been applied. The
underlying BTA was generally not sooted.
Three of four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were
seated and appeared to have functioned properly. The HDP #8 DCS
plunger had been pushed back into the plunger housing, but was
not obstructed by any frangible nut debris. Disassembly of the
DCS at Hangar AF revealed a 77 percent retention. EPON shim
material is no longer bonded to the HDP #7 and #8 aft skirt
structure.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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\The LH f[ustum had a total of 21 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners.
All BSM aero heatshield covers had locked in the fully opened
position, though both left cover attach rings had been bent by
parachute riser entanglement.
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The upper right BSM had rotated approximately 20 degrees coun-
terclockwise. Post flight assessment revealed the set screw
holding the BSM in position had been overloaded by parachute
riser entanglement.
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The LH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited no debonds or
missing TPS. Both RSS antenna covers/phenolic base plates were
intact though the -Z antenna base plate was delaminated.
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Overall view of the aft booster/aft skirt. Separation of the
aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The struts, ETA ring, IEA,
IEA cover, and stiffener rings appeared undamaged.
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L_ _ .
Aft skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition. Hypalon
paint was blistered/missing from the areas where BTA had been
used as a closeout material but the BTA was not sooted or
charred.
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing debris inspection of OV-102 (Columbia) was
conducted 18-21 March 1994 at the Kennedy Space Center on
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway 33 and in the Orbiter
Processing Facility bay #2. This inspection was performed to
identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 97 hits, of which 16 had a
major dimension of one inch or greater. This total does not
include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to
SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A
comparison of these numbers to statistics from 45 previous
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23,
25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known
debris sources), indicates both the total number of hits and
the number of hits 1-inch or larger was less than average
(Figures 6-9).
The following table breaks down the STS-62 Orbiter debris
damage by area :
HITS > i" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface
Upper surface
Right side
Left side
Right OMS Pod
Left OMS Pod
7 36
0 ii
3 7
6 36
0 2
0 5
TOTALS 16 97
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 36 hits, of
which 7 had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater. The
distribution of hits on the lower surface does not suggest a
single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of
ice and Thermal Protection System (TPS) debris from random
sources.
The largest tile damage site measured I0" x 2.5" x 0.675",
involved four tiles, and was located five feet forward and five
feet inboard of the RH main landing gear wheel well leading
edge. The damage site was not that large initially but appears
to have originated from four distinct impacts enlarged by
erosion during re-entry. The remaining tile material in the
damage site showed no significant glazing.
Cluster of hits aft of the LH2 and L02 ET/ORB umbilicals are
believed to be impacts from umbilical ice.
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FIGURE 6.
STS-62
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
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10,0 x 2.5 x .625
Four tiles damaged
1.0 x 1.0 x .063---
TOTAL HITS - 36
HITS > 1 INCH = 7
Corner of ....
NLG door tile
missing
ALL DIMENSIONS
IN INCHES
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FIGURE7.
STS-62
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
!
3xlxO.
4 x 0.5 x 0.5
2.5 x 0.5 x 0.125
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TOTAL HITS - 8
HITS • 1 INCH = 3
STS-62
FIGUREs. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
29 distinct hits
including:
1.25 x 0.75 x 0.5
1.75 x 0.75 x 0.5
1.25 x I x 0.375
I x 0.75 x 0.675
I x 0.75 x 0.5
2 x 2 x 0.675
ALL MEASUREMENTS IN INCHES
TOTAL HITS = 38
HITS • 1 INCH = 6
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FIGURE
STS-62
9. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
//
/
TOTAL HITS = ].5
HITS > 1 INCH = 0
NJ. DIMENSIONS
IN INCHES
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A cluster of 29 damage sites spanned three tiles on the rudder
black edge tiles (left side) along the hinge line below the
split in the speed brake. Six of the damage sites had a major
dimension of 1-inch or larger while three of the damage sites
were deep enough to expose the substrate. Three small hits
occurred in this same general area on the right side of the
rudder/speed brake.
Six thermal barriers, total size approximately 36" x 3" x 1.5",
and one corner tile piece 4" x 4", were missing from the nose
landing gear wheel well. Runway infrared cameras recorded these
objects falling from the Orbiter when the nose landing gear
doors were opened on final approach. A search of the area under
the flight path failed to recover the missing thermal barriers,
which may be submerged in the large body of water south of the
runway. The cause for the loss of the material was attributed
to the way the substrate was prepared for bonding at the
vendor.
No tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris was
identified during the inspection.
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels,
tires, or brakes. The tires were in good condition after a
landing on the KSC runway.
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-I, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned
properly. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation ordnance reten-
tion shutters were closed properly. No significant amounts of
foam or red purge seal adhered to the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical near
the 4-inch flapper valve. No debris was found on the runway
beneath the ET/ORB umbilical cavities.
Charred White RTV protruded from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical
forward outboard and forward inboard pyrotechnic canister to
umbilical plate interfaces.
Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited moderate hazing. Only a
very light haze was present on the other windows. Surface wipes
were taken from all windows for laboratory analysis. Damage to
the window perimeter tiles was typical. No other sites on the
Orbiter were identified for chemical analysis sampling.
Tile damage on the base heat shield was also typical. The Dome
Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets on all three
SSME's were in excellent condition and no material was missing.
Tiles on the vertical stabilizer "stinger" and around the drag
chute door were intact and undamaged with the exception of one
7/8-inch diameter damage site on the +Y edge of the stinger.
i
Runway 33 had been swept/inspected by SLF operations personnel
prior to landing and all potentially damaging debris was
removed.
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The post landing walkdown of Runway 33 was performed
immediately after landing. No unexpected flight hardware was
found on the runway. All Orbiter drag chute hardware was
recovered and showed no signs of abnormal operation. No organic
(bird) debris was found on the runway.
The Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to measure the
surface temperatures of several areas on the vehicle (per OMRSD
V09AJ0.095) . Eight minutes after landing, the Orbiter nosecap
RCC was 224 degrees F. Twenty-two minutes after landing, the RH
wing leading edge RCC panel #9 was 108 degrees F and panel #17
was I00 degrees F (Figure i0) .
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits
and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was less than average
when compared to previous missions (reference Figures Ii-12).
Orbiter Post Launch Debris Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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FIGURE 10. 81"8- 62RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS AS
RECORDED BY THE SHU'n'LE THERMAL IMAGER
RCCPANELI7 10C
TIME 22 minutes
after landing
RCC PANEL9 108
TIME. 22 minutes
after landing
ORBITER:
M ISSION:
0V-102
STS-62
ALL MEASUREMENTS IN
DEGREES FAHRENltEIT
NOSECAP, 224
TIME 8 minutes after landing
FIGURE 11 ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
S TS-6 15 80 36 120
S TS-8 3 29 7 56
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58
STS*I 1 (41-B) 11 19 34 63
STY13 (41_) 5 27 8 36
STY14 (41-D) 10 44 30 111
STS-17 (41-G) 25 69 36 154
S TS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87
S TS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81
S T_27 (51-1) 21 96 33 141
STS-28 (51.J) 7 66 17 111
S TS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183
S TS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257
STS-32 (61_) 20 134 3g 193
STS-29 18 100 23 132
S TS-28R 13 60 20 76
S TS-34 17 51 18 53
STS_33R 21 107 21 118
STS-32R 13 111 15 120
STS_36 17 61 19 81
STS-31R 13 47 14 63
S TS-41 13 64 16 76
STS-38 7 70 8 81
STS_5 15 132 17 147
STS-37 7 91 10 113
S TS_39 14 217 16 238
S TS-40 23 153 25 197
STS-43 24 122 25 131
S TS-48 14 100 25 182
STS-44 6 74 9 101
STS-45 18 122 22 172
S TS-4 g 6 55 11 114
STS-50 28 141 45 184
S TS-46 11 186 22 236
STS-47 3 48 11 108
STS_52 6 152 16 290
STS-53 11 145 23 240
STS-54 14 80 14 131
S TS_56 18 94 38 156
STS-55 10 128 13 143
STS-57 10 75 12 106
STS-51 8 100 18 154
S TS_58 23 78 26 155
S TS-61 7 5 g 13 120
S TS-60 4 48 15 106
AVERAGE 14.2 91.6 21.5 132.8
SIGMA 7.4 44.1 10.5 58.0
STS_ .... .... 7 _ _ ls e7
MISSIONS STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 3OR, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANAL YSIS
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES
61
0
m
0
\
I
0
LO
co
I 1 '1 / '1 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 uO 0 cO 0
CO C_l Od =- _--
S_!H
O
LO
O
Of)
O9
CO
o_
T
D
il
A
O9
q-
62
or-102 Columbia landed on Kennedy Space Center SLF
runway 33 on 18 March 1994
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Overall view of the Orbiter left side
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Overall view of Orbiter nose. Windows #3 and #4 exhibited
moderate hazing. Only a very light haze was present on the
other windows. Damage to the window perimeter tiles was typical
C(DL_,, ti t-ii '''TP ''_ D p- _DI I
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tTile damage on the base heat shield was typical. The Dome
Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets on all three
SSME's were in excellent condition and no material was missing.
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The Orbiter lower surface tiles sustained a total of 36 hits,
of which 7 had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater. The
largest tile damage site measured i0" x 2.5" x 0.7" and was
located near the RH MLG wheel well. The damage site was not
that large initially but appears to have originated from four
distinct impacts enlarged by erosion during re-entry.
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was
opened.
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was
opened.
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Charred white RTV protruded from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical
forward outboard and forward inboard pyrotechnic canister to
umbilical plate interfaces.
7O
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Thermal barrier that fills the gap between the nose gear wheel
well and the leading edges of the nose gear doors (in the
closed position) was missing. The cause was attributed to the
procedure for substrate preparation.
...... •" H
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Thermal barrier, as large as 36 inches in length, fell from the
Orbiter nose wheel well as the landing gear door opened on
final approach. The thermal barrier, which was still at an
elevated temperature from re-entry, was clearly visible in the
infrared views but virtually invisible in the landing films.
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vA cluster of 29 damage sites spanned three tiles on the rudder
black edge tiles along the hinge line below the split in the
speed brake. Three hits occurred in this same general area on
the right side of the rudder/speed brake.
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Six of the damage sites on the rudder hinge line had a major
dimension of 1-inch or larger while three of the damage sites
were deep enough to expose substrate.
•j r_ r"COLOR Pb_O lOG, ..,,b'14
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8.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of eight samples were obtained from OV-102 Columbia
during the STS-62 post landing debris assessment at Kennedy
Space Center. The samples consisted of 16 wipes (i IPA, 1 dry
for each window) from Orbiter windows #i - #8. The samples were
analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB)
for material composition and comparison to known STS materials.
Debris analysis involves placing and correlating of particles
and residues with respect to composition, thermal (mission)
effects, and availability. Debris sample results/analyses are
listed by Orbiter location in the following summaries.
ORBITER WINDOWS
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to SRB BSM
exhaust, Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) materials,
paints and primer from various sources, window polish residue,
and natural landing site products. Building insulation fibers
and carbon steel spheres were also present. All of these
materials have been previously observed and occurred only in
trace quantities. There was no apparent vehicle damage related
to these residuals.
ORGANIC ANALYSIS
Organic analysis for this sampling provided an indication of
exposure to Orbiter TPS, 0MS FRCS nozzle paper cover adhesive,
and window protective cover materials. A finding that has been
noted previously was that of polysulfide, such as the sealant
material used on the SRB forward skirt door. All of these
materials have been noted in previous debris sample analyses.
STS-60 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
Organic analysis of STS-60 window samples has been completed
and indicated exposure to materials from Orbiter TPS, FWD RCS
nozzle paper cover adhesive, window protective covers, and
polysulfide, such as that found in the SRB forward skirt flight
door sealant.
NEW FINDINGS
No new findings were noted in these sample results (Figure 13).
A previously documented material, polysulfide, was found in
both the STS-62 and STS-60 organi_ analyses. This material is
believed to have originated during ground processing. No
vehicle damage occurred that would appear related to these
residual findings.
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9.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, ten post
launch anomalies, including one In-Flight Anomaly (IFA), were
observed on the STS-62 mission.
9.1 LAUNCH PAD/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY
1. A 4.5 inch long by 1 inch diameter bolt was found underneath
the MLP sound suppression pipe near the southeast corner of the
LH SRB exhaust hole after launch. A metal shim measuring 12 x 8
inches was also found under the sound suppression pipe near the
north west corner of the RH SRB exhaust hole. Both items
originated from the sound suppression pipe support stanchion at
the north end of the LH SRB exhaust hole. Several other shim
pieces were loose at this same location. Time of failure was
not evident from hardware condition or film/video review.
9.2 EXTERNAL TANK
1. Intertank foam, 14 inches long by 4 inches wide, was missing
from a stringer head forward of the left (-Y) bipod spindle
housing closeout. Approximately 3 inches of primer was exposed.
2. A small divot appeared just aft of the -Y bipod spindle in
the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout.
3. A divot, 5.5 inches in diameter but shallow in depth,
occurred in the LH2 tank acreage just aft of the LH2 tank-to-
intertank flange closeout between the +Y bipod spindle housing
closeout and the L02 feedline support bracket (XT-1129).
4. A divot, 5 inches in diameter, occurred in the LH2 tank
acreage (XT-1590) adjacent to the +Y side of the cable tray.
The divot went to substrate and exposed the primer.
9.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
1. Significant amounts of BTA had been applied to closeouts on
the RH frustum. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the
areas where the BTA had been applied. The underlying BTA was
not sooted except along the 395 ring aft of the BSM cluster.
The soot pattern indicated some of the blisters may have
formed prior to SRB separation (IFA STS-62-B-I) .
2. The RH frustum was missing one 2" x 2" area of TPS near the
BSH's and had 23 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners.
3. The LH frustum was missing TPS in one area (3"x2") near the
-Y axis/275 ring frame and had 21MSA-2 debonds over fasteners.
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9.4 ORBITER
i. A cluster of 29 damage sites spanned three tiles on the
rudder black edge tiles (left side) along the hinge line below
the split in the speed brake. Six of the damage sites had a
major dimension of l-inch or larger while three of the damage
sites were deep enough to expose the substrate. Three small
hits occurred in this same general area on the right side of
the rudder/speed brake.
2. Six thermal barriers, total size approximately 36" x 3" x
1.5", and one corner tile piece 4" x 4", were missing from the
nose landing gear doors. Runway infrared cameras recorded these
objects falling from the Orbiter when the nose landing gear
doors were opened on final approach.
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary
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ENGINEERING AND SCIENCEPROGRAM
2400 NASA Road _,P O Box 58561, Houston, Texas 77258 (713) 333-5411
April 19, '1994
Greg Katnik
MC/TV-MSD-22
OSB Room 5203R
KSC, Florida 32899
Dear Greg,
The following STS-62 Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space
Center Photographic and Television Analysis Project, and was completed April 19, 1994. If
you have any questions or comments please contact Christine Dailey/483-5336 of the
Photographic and Television A,aalysis Project.
D
Sincerely,
 eO ley 
Project Specialist
Photo/TV Analysis Project
cc: Job order file
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1.0 OV-102 STS-62 Film/Video and Timing
Summary
1.1 LAUNCH
Columbia (OV-102) launched on mission STS-62 from pad B at 13:53:00.019 Coordinated
Universal Time (UTC) on March 4, 1994 (day 63) as seen on camera E-13. Solid rocket booster
(SRB) separation occurred at 13:55:06.295 UTC as seen on camera E-211.
On launch day, 24 videos were screened. Following launch day, 55 films were reviewed.
No anomalies were observed during launch.
Detailed test objective (DTO)-0312 (photography of the external tank after separation) was
performed this mission using the umbilical well cameras and a handheld Nikon camera with a
300 mm lens and 2X extender. Thirty-six handheld frames of the external tank (ET) were
acquired by the astronauts. The tank appeared to be in good condition on the handheld film with
the exception of a possible divot on the LH2/intertank interface on the -Z side of the ET. Video
of the external tank was down linked on March 4, 1994. All sides of the external tank were
imaged. Two rolls of umbilical well film were received: the 35 mm film from the LO2
umbilical and a 16 mm film (5 mm lens) from the LH2 umbilical. The 16 mm camera with the
10 mm lens did not operate. Several divots were noted on the umbilical well film including a
linear shaped mark on the intertank acreage that exposed substrate primer. Numerous pieces of
insulation and frozen hydrogen debris were seen during the SRB and external tank separations.
A piece of white RTV debris was seen near the LO2 umbilical.
1.2 ON ORBIT
No on orbit anomalies were identified.
1.3 LANDING
Columbia landed on runway 33 at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on March 18, 1994. Fourteen
videos of the Orbiter's approach and landing were received. Four views were acquired from
infrared cameras. NASA Select, which broadcasts multiple real-time views, was also received.
Left main gear touchdown was at 77:13:09:40.354 UTC and right main gear touchdown
occurred at 77:13:09:40.387 UTC as seen on camera KTV-33. Nose wheel touchdown occurred
at 77:13:09:59.512 UTC and wheel stop was at 77:13:10:34.313 UTC as seen on camera KTV-
15.
Fifteen landing films were received from KSC and no anomalies were observed.
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1.0 OV-102 STS-62 Film/Video and Timing
Summary
Figure 1.3 Debris at Landing Gear Deploy
Four pieces of debris fell from the vehicle at landing gear deploy as seen on infrared video views
EL- 17 and EL- 18. Two of the items appeared to originate from the main gear doors (most
visible at 77:13:09:20.991 UTC). The other two pieces appeared to originate from the nose gear
area (most visible at 77:13:09:22.721 UTC). These debris items are believed to be the missing
nose gear door thermal barrier material noted on the walk around video. (Debris was seen to fall
from the nose gear area on infrared views of the landing gear deploy on STS-56. The STS-56
debris objects were reported by KSC to be gap fillers from the landing gear doors.)
The Orbiter was seen to deviate from the runway centerline during rollout prior to nose gear
touchdown. At approximately 5 seconds after main gear touchdown, the Orbiter began to move
to the right of the runway centerline. At 8 seconds, the Orbiter reached a maximum starboard
distance of the runway centerline. At 11 seconds, the Orbiter reached a maximum port distance
of the runway centerline. Steering changes were not visible after fourteen seconds past main
gear touchdown.
The deployment of the drag chute appeared as expected. KTV-33 was used to determine drag
chute initiation and pilot chute inflation. All of the remaining drag chute sequence times were
obtained from KTV- 15.
Drag chute initiation
Pilot chute inflation
Drag chute bag release
Drag chute inflation
in reefed position
Drag chute inflation in
disreefed configuration
Drag chute release
77:13:09:54.634 UTC
77:13:09:55.502 UTC
77:13:09:56.372 UTC
77:13:09:57.803 UTC
77:13:10:00.711 UTC
77:13:10:21.600 UTC
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Summary
The following items were noted during the post-landing walk around: damage (bending) to the
left main landing gear heat shield disks and an inboard right main landing gear heat shield disk;
tile damage on the nose gear starboard door; tile damage to the left nose, underside, and right
side of the vehicle; tread damage to the outboard left main tire; missing nose gear door thermal
barrier material; loose string-like material on the +Y edge of the drag chute housing; slight TPS
scarring near the forward ET/Orbiter attach; TPS erosion on the base heat shield.
1.4 TIMING ACTIVITIES
All launch videos had timing and film cameras E-l, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-6, E-7, E-8, E-9, E-10,
E-11, E-12, E-13, E-14, E-15, E-16, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-25, E-26, E-52, E-54, E-57, E-59,
E-211, E-222 and E-224 had in-frame alphanumeric timing. These videos and films were used to
time specific mission events during the initial screening. Additional film from launch cameras
E-40, E-79, E-204, E-208, E-212, E-220, and E-223 were used to time events using encoded film
edge timing marks (IRIG-A and IRIG-B). Camera E-76 did not have timing.
All landing videos had timing except EL-17 IR, the Mobile IR, SLF North, and SLF South. All
landing film cameras had timing and EL-l, EL-2, EL-3, EL-4, EL-5, EL-7, EL-8, EL-9, EL- 10,
EL-12, EL-15, EL-19, and EL-20 had in-tYame alphanumeric timing.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.1 DEBRIS
2.1.1 Debris near the Time of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Ignition
2.1.1.1 Debris Strike to RSRB aft Booster Separation Motor Nozzle
(Cameras E-5, E-9)
A large piece of white debris (ice) struck the RSRB aft BSM nozzle at T-2.16 seconds. No
damage to the vehicle was observed. KSC reported that this ice was from the RSRB/ET aft
attach fittings. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.1.2 LH2 and LO2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T- 0 Umbilical Disconnect Debris
(Cameras E-3, E-17, E-20, E-76, E-77)
Normal white (ice) debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical
disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. A thin white rectangular piece of debris fell
from the LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical lines after SSME ignition. This debris may have been a tag or
a piece of tape. None of these objects were observed to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action
was requested.
2.1.1.3 LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter Umbilical Debris
(Cameras E-5, E-6, E-15, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-25, E-26, E-31, E-65, OTV-109,
OTV-154, OTV-161, OTV-163)
Normal white (ice) debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical
disconnect areas and aft along the body flap at SSME ignition through liftoff. White debris was
seen falling from the LH2 17 !.nch feedline bellows during SSME ignition. None of the debris
was observed to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.2 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition
2.1.2.1 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7)
(Cameras E-5, E-7, E-9, E-13, E-14, E-15, E-16, OTV-163)
As on previous missions, several pieces of debris were noted originating from the SRB flame
duct area after SRB ignition. On camera OTV-163, one piece of light colored debris originated
from the RSRB flame duct near holddown post #M-1 at 0.415 seconds MET. The debris moved
toward the mid/lower surface of the Orbiter body flap but did not appear to strike the vehicle.
On camera E-5, the same debris was first seen near the base of the RSRB and traveled
underneath the body flap at lifloff. True three dimensional velocity information is not available.
The average horizontal velocity of the debris was determined to be 47 feet per second.
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2.1.2.2 Flame Trench Debris at Liftoff
(Cameras OTV-160, E-60, E-62)
Figure 2.1.2.2 Flame Trench Debris at Liftoff
(Camera OTV- 160)
On camera OTV-160, a light colored piece of debris was seen north of the launch pad in the
exhaust cloud at 0.718 seconds MET. The debris appeared to move toward the vehicle in the
OTV- 160 view. This debris was not seen from other cameras so its direction of travel could not
be confirmed. Additional debris was seen falling toward the flame trench on the OTV-160 view
at 3.054 seconds MET and 3.54 seconds MET. The OTV-141 and OTV-148 views of the north
side of the SLV were examined for debris moving toward the vehicle. No indication of debris
moving toward the vehicle was found on the OTV-141 and OTV-148 views. On camera E-60, a
single piece of light colored debris traveled from the SRB flame trench south toward the vehicle.
On camera E-62, a single piece of SRB flame trench debris traveled away from the vehicle.
None of the debris was seen to strike the vehicle. No follow up action was requested.
2.1.2.3 Debris near Holddown Posts (HDP)
(Camera E-7, E-9, E-12, E-14)
A single piece of dark debris fell aft of the RSRB holddown post #M- 1 debris containment
system (DCS) at 0.913 seconds MET. A thin rectangular piece of red colored debris (probably
tape) fell from the LSRB aft skirt below the HDP #M-5 foot and then fell into the flame duct at
liftoff. Several pieces of light colored debris were seen near the RSRB holddown post #M-4 and
the LSRB holddown post #M-8 (probably flame duct debris) at liftoff. None of this debris was
seen to strike the vehicle. No ordnance or frangible nut debris were seen near any of the
holddown post DCS stud holes. No follow-up action was requested.
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2.1.2.4 Debris Falling Along Left Inboard Elevon
(Camera E-50)
A light colored piece of debris was seen falling along the left inboard elevon at liftoff. The
debris did not appear to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.3 Debris After Liftoff
(Cameras E-40, E-50, E-52, E-54, E-57, E-59, E-65, E-79, E-207, E-212, E-213,
E-220, E-222, E-223, KTV-4B, OTV-161, OTV-163)
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle (SLV) at liftoff,
throughout the roll maneuver, and beyond on the launch tracking views. Most of the debris
sightings were probably reaction control system (RCS) paper or ice from the ET/Orbiter
umbilicals. During ascent, multiple pieces of debris exited the SRB exhaust plume. None of the
debris was observed to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.3.1 Debris Near ET AFT Dome During Tower Clear
(Camera E-40, E-79, OTV-161)
Figure 2.1.3.1 Debris Near ET Aft Dome During Tower Clear
Several pieces of orange colored debris were seen near the ET aft dome falling aft during tower
clear. The debris had the characteristics of umbilical baggy material. The debris was timed at
approximately 4.4 seconds MET on the three camera views. A multicolored piece of debris seen
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aft of the ET on OTV-161 was confirmed to be the same as debris seen on E-40 and E-79 based
on similar event times.
2.1.3.2 Debris during Roll Maneuver
(Camera E-57)
A small orange-colored piece of debris originated from the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical area
during roll maneuver and fell aft at 12.86 seconds MET. KSC reported this object to be
hydrogen fire detection butcher paper from the ET LH2 vertical strut. The object did not appear
to strike the vehicle.
2.1.3.3 Debris between 20 and 23 Seconds MET
(Cameras E-54, E-59)
At least two pieces of debris were seen falling along the RSRB exhaust plume at 20.642 MET on
Camera E-59. On camera E-54, two light colored pieces of debris were seen near the LSRB
plume at 22.498 MET.
2.1.3.4 Debris at 28 Seconds MET
(Cameras KTV-4, E-222, E-213)
Figure 2.1.3.4 Debris at 28 Seconds MET
A fast moving light colored piece of debris first seen over the right wing and traveled aft into the
SSME plume at 28.0 seconds MET. This debris was tentatively identified by KSC personnel as
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an intact forward RCS cover. Smaller, red colored debris were seen falling over the right wing
and near the vertical stabilizer at approximately the same time. The smaller debris was first seen
by the Orbiter overhead cabin window and is believed to be forward RCS paper.
2.1.3.5 Debris between 32 to 68.5 Seconds MET
(Cameras E-212, E-213, E-220, E-222)
Numerous pieces of light colored debris traveled aft along the SRB plume during ascent. A
single light colored piece of debris was seen near the LSRB nozzle and then fell aft along the
SRB plume at 32 seconds MET on camera E-212. A single light colored piece of debris was
seen along the SRB plume at 38.8 seconds MET on camera E-222. Multiple pieces of debris
were seen falling aft along the SRB plume between approximately 57 to 68.5 seconds MET on
camera E-220. In some cases the debris was seen coming from the SRB nozzle area.
2.1.3.6 Debris Reported by the Crew (Task #10)
The following is a written transcript of the crew debris report provided by STS-62 Commander
to the Mission Control Center Capcom on March 4, 1994.
Capcom
Columbia, Houston.
for your windows?
For John and Andy, when you get a chance can you give the debris report
Columbia
OK, give us just a couple of minutes.
Columbia
Houston, Columbia.
Capcom
Go ahead Columbia.
Columbia
Yeah Ken, John is off com for just a couple of minutes. He will give you status on left side. On
the pilot side, I would say minor smudging on the forward and the two right windows. It looks a
whole lot better than my last trip.
Capcom
OK, we copy some minor smudging on the right side windows and we will stand-by for John
when he gets back.
Columbia
And Ken, that was all after SRB separation as you guys probably know.
Capcom
We copy, thank you Andy.
Columbia
Houston, Columbia
Capcom
Columbia, Houston. John go ahead.
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Columbia
OK, Ken. The debris report on the CDR side, some smudges, about 6 or 8 on Window 3 and a
few smudges on Window 2. Looks pretty good.
Capcom
Roger, we copy, 6 or 8 smudges on Window 3 and a few on Window 2, but over all windows
look in good shape.
Columbia
Very clean, maybe better than last time.
Capcom
Roger, we copy.
2.2 MLP EVENTS
2.2.1 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-burning Hydrogen)
(Cameras E-2, E-3, E-15, E-18, E-20, E-36, E-76, E-77, OTV-163, OTV-170,
OTV-171)
An orange vapor (possibly free burning laydrogen) was seen beneath the SSMEs and under the
body flap prior to SSME ignition. Orange vapor was seen south of the left OMS pod on camera
E-36. The amount of orange vapors visible appeared less than on many of the previous missions.
No follow-up action was requested.
2.2.2 TPS Erosion
(Cameras E- 18, E-20)
Two occurrences of TPS erosion were noted on the base heat shield after SSME startup. One
was outboard of SSME #2 and the other was on the tip of the left RCS stinger below the L3A jet.
Erosion of the base heat shield TPS has been seen on previous missions. No follow-up action
was requested.
2.3 ASCENT EVENTS
2.3.1 Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
(Cameras E-207, E-213, E-222)
Slight body flap motion was noted during time of maximum dynamic pressure (30-90 seconds
MET). The magnitude of the motion seen on the STS-62 views did not warrant further analysis.
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2.3.2 Flares in SSME plume
(Cameras E-52, E-204, E-205, E-207,E-218, E-220, E-222, KTV-4B, KTV-21B,
ET-207)
Figure 2.3.2 Flares in SSME Plume
(Camera ET-207)
At least nine flares were noted in the SSME plumes from 23 to 54 seconds MET. One flare,
approximately 0.07 seconds in duration, was noted at 52.6 seconds MET. Flares have been
observed on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
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2.3.3 Vapor Cloud at 57 Seconds MET
(Cameras E-224, E-21 I, KTV-5)
Figure 2.3.3 Vapor Cloud Near SRB Plume
(Camera KTV-5)
A vapor cloud was seen near the SRB plume at 57.259 seconds MET. The rawinsonde data was
compared to the trajectory data and it was concluded that the vapors are due to a layer of
moisture at an altitude of approximately 10 km. A similar event was noted on the STS-48
mission.
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Orange Flashes in SRB Plume Prior to SRB Separation
(Cameras ET-204, E-204, E-212)
Figure 2.3.4 Orange Flashes in SRB Plume Prior to SRB Separation
Several orange flashes were noted in the SRB plume just prior to SRB separation. A orange
flash was seen at the interface of the SSME and SRB plumes at approximately 115 seconds
MET. An engineer from the JSC Propulsion & Power Division reviewed the films of these
flashes and no follow-up action was assigned. A similar orange flash was previously identified
on STS-53 and discussions with MSFC personnel at that time indicated that the event was not
anomalous.
2.3.5 Linear Optical Effect
(Cameras E-207, E-212, ET-208)
Linear optical effects were seen between 62 and 108 seconds MET. The linear optical effects
began at 54 seconds and ended at 57.7 seconds MET on camera E-212. Linear optical effects
were seen on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
2.3.6 Recirculation (Task #1)
(Cameras E-204, ET-204)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB separation
has been seen on nearly all previous missions. The sighting of this event is dependent upon
STS-62 Final Report 100

2.0 Summary of Significant Events
launch inclination angle and cloud cover during ascent. For STS-62, recirculation was observed
between 94 and 101 seconds MET on camera ET-204.
Cameras on which recirculation was observed for STS-62
CAMERA [ START _seconds MET) [ STOP _seconds MET)
ET-204* 94 101
E-204 95 98
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION
MISSION
STS-26
STS-27
STS-29
STS-30
STS-28
STS-31
RECIRCULATION BY MISSION
START
{sec MET)
92
95
92
95
94
STS-34 95
STS-33 95
STS-32 100
STS-36 93
91
STS-41
STS-38
STS-35
STS-37
STS-39
STS-40
STS-43
STS-48
STS--44
STS-42
STS-45
STS-49
STS-50
STS--46
STS-47
STS-52
STS-53
STS-54
STS-56
STS-55
STS-57
STS-51
STS-58
STS-61
STS-60
STS-62
91
94
92
92
92
94
91
95
STOP
(sec MET_
112
112
: 104
112
109
103
108
112
110
107
107
10l
._°
110
108
113
92 111
97 109
93 110
98 110
96 112
92 105
92 113
96 104
94
93
94
94
94
92
93
92
94
108
111
110
109
112
102
113
109
101
BEST VIEW
E204
E205
E208
E204,E206
E205
E204
E206
E204,E206
E207
E206
E206
n/a
E212
E204
INCLIN.
ANGLE
28.5 °
57.0 °
28.45 °
28.85 °
57.0 °
34.3 °
28.45 °
28.5 °
62.0 °
28.45 °
28.45 °
28.5 °
28.45 °
28.45 °
E205 57.0 °
.__ 39.0 °
E204 28.45 °
E205 57.0 °
E204
E205
E205
E212
E208
ET208
E205
E208
E207
E212
E205
E208
E204
E204
E204
E208
E205
ET-204
28.45 °
57.0 °
57.0 °
28.35 °
28.45 °
28.45 °
57.0 °
28.45 °
57.0 °
28.45 °
57.0 °
28.45 °
28.5 °
28.5 °
39.0 °
28.5 °
57.0 °
39.0 °
NOTE: No recirculation was observed on STS-40 films due to cloud cover and inclination angle. Intermittent LOV prevented
acquisition of specific stop times for recirculation on STS-27, STS-30 and STS-34. Best view chosen by duration and clarity of
event on films.
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2.4 DTO-312
2.4.1 Onboard Handheld Camera ET Analysis (Task #6)
(STS-62-46-01 through 36)
Thirty-six exposures from a 35 millimeter Nikon F4 camera were taken with Ektar 100 film and
a 300 millimeter lens coupled with a 2x multiplier. The photographs were taken by Marsha
Ivins. The entire ET was photographed. The first photograph was taken at 14:08:31 UTC and
the thirty-sixth was taken at 14:13:11 UTC, which was 15 minutes 31 seconds and 20 minutes 11
seconds MET respectively. The ET was approximately 1700 meters from the Orbiter at the time
of the first photograph. The separation velocity between the ET and the Orbiter was calculated
to be 5.7 meters per second. This velocity is similar to previous missions. The ET visually
performed as expected and no significant TPS ablations were noted. Two separate light colored
areas on the intertank acreage (-Y axis) were noted. These light colored areas are probably pre-
launch closeout marks.
Figure 2.4.1 Handheid Camera View of -Z Axis of External Tank
(Camera STS-62-46-26)
A light area visible on the LH2 tank/intertank interface on the -Z axis is a possible divot.
Excellent quality video of the STS-62 external tank (after separation) was down linked on Friday
March 4, 1994. A camcorder with a 2X extender and a 10 to 1 zoom lens was used to image the
external tank. The ET was well tracked over nearly 13 minutes of video. The average tumble
rate of the external tank was calculated to be 0.85 degrees/second. All sides of the external tank
were imaged. The external tank appeared in good condition on the video views.
STS-62 Final Report 102

2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.4.2 Umbilical Well Camera Analysis (Task #5)
2.4.2.1 16 mm Umbilical Well Camera Views of SRB and ET Separation
One 16 mm motion picture film (with a 5 mm lens) was acquired from the Orbiter LH2 umbilical
camera. The 16 mm film sequence of the SRB separation is good quality. The LSRB separation and the
external tank separation appeared normal. The 16 mm umbilical film sequence of ET separation has
variable exposure due to sun glare. The focus is soft to good.
Figure 2.4.2.1a LSRB at Separation
(Frame STS-62-G-241-1135)
Numerous light colored pieces of debris (probably insulation) are in view throughout the SRB
film sequence (1). Typical chipping and erosion of the -Y electric cable tray are visible (2).
Erosion and scarring of the ET/LSRB aft attach are visible (3). A gray colored, shiny piece of
top coat debris is visible in front of the LSRB approximately 0.3 seconds after SRB separation
(4). A light colored piece of TPS was seen detaching from the base of the LH2 electric cable tray
prior to SRB separation (frame 743). A loose piece of TPS was also seen at the side of the LH2
umbilical (frame 1061). A small dark object is visible moving from the ET side of the ET/LSRB
attach toward the LSRB side of the attach point at approximately 0.06 seconds after LSRB
separation (frame 1069). KSC reported that this debris is a piece of char top coat from the ET -Y
vertical strut. A flat, thin, rectangular shaped piece of debris was seen in front of the electric
cable tray after SRB separation. The debris is gray in color and out of focus (indicating that it is
very close to the camera) (frame 1078). Several small light colored pieces of debris (probably
insulation) are visible striking the top of horizontal section of the electric cable tray prior to and
after SRB separation (frames 1019, 1139, 1584, 3613). A light colored piece of debris (foam)
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can be seen striking the vertical section of the electric cable tray after SRB separation (frame
1684). A larger piece of white debris (frozen hydrogen) can be seen striking the top of the
horizontal section of the electric cable tray prior to ET separation (frame 3788). None of these
debris strikes appeared to damage the ET structure.
Figure 2.4.2.1b LH2 Umbilical After ET Separation
(Frame STS-62-G-241-5571)
A possible piece of detached insulation is visible on the upper right side of the LH2 umbilical
after ET separation (1). Frozen hydrogen is visible in the LH2 17 inch line connection (2). A
blistering of the fire barrier coating on the outboard side of the LH2 umbilical is apparent (3). A
light colored area (possible frozen hydrogen) is visible on the upper left side of the LH2
umbilical above the piece of detached insulation (frame 5821). A white mark is visible below
the ET diagonal strut on the -Y side of the ET LO2 umbilical (frame 6229). This mark was also
seen on the 35 mm umbilical well film. A gray colored flexible debris object is visible in front
of the ET cross beam near the LO2 umbilical (frames 6266 - 6496). KSC reported that this
debris is a piece of white RTV from the Orbiter side of the LO2 umbilical. This debris was "also
seen on the 35 mm umbilical well film. A white rectangular shaped piece of debris (probably
frozen hydrogen) is visible at the right side of the view well after ET separation (frame 10115).
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2.4.2.2 35 mm Umbilical Well Camera Views of ET Separation
Figure 2.4.2.2a Divot on Intertank TPS Parallel to the Stringer Heads
(Camera STS062-64-011 )
A white linear shaped mark is visible on the intertank TPS parallel to the stringer heads (1). A
dark area at the aft end of this mark may be exposed primer. The divot was measured to be 19.79
inches in length. Numerous small white erosion or "pop corn" marks are visible on the intertank
and the LH2 tank TPS in the vicinity of the forward ET/Orbiter attach bipod (2). A small white
divot is visible on the LH2 tank TPS to the right of the electric cable tray just aft of the PAL
ramp (3). A dark area at the center of the divot appears to be exposed primer. Both jack pad
closeouts appeared intact (4). A shallow divot is visible in the LH2 tank acreage near the LO2
feedline and the right leg of the forward bipod (5).
k .
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Figure 2.4.2.2b Debris Near ET Cross Beam
(Camera STS062-64-050)
A shiny gray colored piece of debris is visible ( 1). The object is longer than it is wide and is
irregular in shape. The debris is first visible in front of the cross beam. The debris then moves
across the top of the LO2 umbilical and falls aft. At least one smaller gray colored debris object
is also visible. The larger shiny gray colored debris is also visible on the 16 mm umbilical well
film in front of the cross beam near the LO2 umbilical. The object appears flexible on the 16
mm motion picture view. KSC reported that this object is probably white RTV from the Orbiter
side of the umbilical.
A light colored area (,probably loose foam) is visible just inboard of the LO2 umbilical at the
forward left corner (2). This light colored area can be seen below the diagonal strut on the -Y
side of the ET LO2 umbilical on the 16 mm umbilical well camera film. Two small light colored
marks are visible in the forward right portion of the LO2 electrical monoball disconnect (3). It
appears possible that a small object has lodged at this position. Previous mission views were
screened and nothing similar was noted. A small section of red purge seal material appears
covered over with white RTV on the LO2 umbilical near the 7 o' clock position of the electrical
monoball disconnect (4). Numerous voids and eroded areas are visible on the vertical and
horizontal sections of the LO2 electric cable tray (5). A white mark is visible on the +Y limb on
the LH2 tank TPS above the RSRB attach area (6). This white mark appears to be a divot. TPS
erosion and voids are visible on the aft LO2 fcedline bellows and support bracket (7). A small
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amount of TPS erosion or scarring is visible on the forward end of the +Y thrust strut. KSC
reported that what appeared to be a gray to silver colored object between the cross beam and the
diagonal strut just above the LO2 umbilical was not an object but a paint brush stroke (8). The
LO2 lightning contact strips appear in place (9). The red seal around the EO-3 fitting appears
intact (10). An out of focus rectangular shaped white colored debris object is visible between the
camera and the LH2 tank TPS on frame 33. Other smaller white debris objects are visible
throughout the film sequence. These white debris objects appear to be frozen hydrogen.
2.5 LANDING EVENTS
2.5.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video (Task #3)
(Cameras SLF-North, SLF-South)
Camera SLF-South was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear. The analysis
considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to touchdown. Data was
gathered at a sample rate of 30 frames per second. An assumption was made that the line of sight
of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter y-axis. Scaling information was determined by
using the distance between the main gear struts. The vertical difference of the projected main
gear point for two successive frames was multiplied by the scaling factor to find the change in
height of the main gear over that interval_ The main gear height above the runway was
determined by assigning the frame of touchdown a height of 0 feet, and cumulatively adding the
previous frames. These heights were then regressed with respect to time. Sink rate equals the
slope of this regression line. The main gear sink rate was determined to be 3.3 feet per second.
Main Gear Sink Rate from Vide¢
3.5
•_ 2.5
.__
I) •
C
0.5
-1 -0.9
measured sink rate = 3.3 feet per second
-0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.I 0
Time relative to Touchdown
(seconds)
Figure 2.5.1a Graph of Right Main Gear Height Versus Time Prior to Touchdown
Camera SLF-North was used to determine the landing sink rate of the nose gear. The analysis
considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to touchdown. Data was
gathered at a sample rate of 30 frames per second. An assumption was made that the line of sight
of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter y-axis. Scaling information was determined by
using the distance between the main gear struts. The vertical difference of the digitized nose
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gear point from the average of the main gear points was multiplied by the scaling factor to find
the height of the nose gear for a single frame. An empirical offset correction was made to
produce a calculated height at main gear touchdown of 0 feet. These heights were then regressed
with respect to time. Sink rate equals the slope of this regression line. The nose gear sink rate
was determined to be 2.9 feet per second.
Nose Gear Sink Rate from Video
- 1 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0,3 -0,2 -0.1 0
Time relative to ,Touchdown
(seconds)
Figure 2.5.1b Graph of Nose Gear Height Versus Time During Rollout
2.5.2 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film (Task #3)
(Cameras EL- 7, EL-9)
Camera EL-9 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear. The analysis
considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to touchdown. Data was
gathered at a sample rate of 100 frames per second. An assumption was made that the line of
sight of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter y-axis. Scaling information was determined
by using the distance between the main gear struts. The vertical difference of the projected main
gear point for two successive frames was multiplied by the scaling factor to find the change in
height of the main gear over that interval. The main gear height above the runway was
determined by assigning the frame of touchdown a height of 0 feet, and cumulatively adding the
previous frames. These heights were then regressed with respect to time. Sink rate equals the
slope of this regression line. The main gear sink rate was determined to be 3.2 fi_et per second.
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Main Gear Sink Rate from Film
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Figure 2.5.2a Graph of Right Main Gear Height Versus Time Prior to Touchdown
Camera EL-7 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the nose gear. The analysis
considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to touchdown. Data was
gathered at a sample rate of 100 frames per second. An assumption was made that the line of
sight of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter y-axis. Scaling information was determined
by using the distance between the main gear struts. The vertical difference of the digitized nose
gear point from the average of the main gear points was multiplied by the scaling factor to find
the height of the nose gear for a single frame. An empirical offset correction was made to
produce a calculated height at main gear touchdown of 0 feet. These heights were then regressed
with respect to time. Sink rate equals the slope of this regression line. The nose gear sink rate
was determined to be 2.8 feet per second.
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Nose Gear Sink Rate from Film
- 1 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0
Time relative to Touchdown
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Figure 2.5.2b Graph of Nose Gear Height Versus Time During Rollout
2.5.3 Drag Chute Performance (Task #9)
(Cameras EL-l, EL-2, EL-3, EL-4, EL-5, EL-7, EL-9, EL-10, EL-12, EL-15,
EL-19, EL-20, EL-17 IR, EL-18 IR, KTV-5L, KTV-6L, KTV-11L, KTV-15L,
KTV- 16L, KTV-33L, SLF North, SLF-South)
The landing of Columbia at the end of mission STS-62 marked the thirteenth deployment of the
Orbiter drag chute. All components of the drag chute appeared to deploy as expected. Standard
analysis of the drag chute angles as a function of time was performed using the views from the
film cameras EL-7 and EL-9. This analysis is used to support the improvement of the
aerodynamic math models currently in use. The maximum horizontal chute deflection was
approximately 4.8 degrees. The riser angle ranged from a maximum of 6.3 degrees near chute
initiation to a minimum of -4.8 degrees after disreefing. Figure 2.5.3a presents the measured
heading angle versus time. Figure 2.5.3b presents the measured riser angle versus time.
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STS-62 Heading Angle versus Time
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Figure 2.5.3b Graph of Drag Chute Riser Angle Versus Time During Rollout
2.6 OTHER NORMAL EVENTS
Other normal events observed include: a frost line was noted between the base of the SSME #2
bell and the base heat shield at SSME startup; DMHS vibration noted at SSME ignition; RCS
paper debris after SSME ignition; frost on the ET GOX vent louvers; body flap motion noted
after SSME ignition; right and left inboard and outboard elevon motion visible after SSME
ignition and at liftoff; ice and vapor from the ground umbilical carrier plate (GUCP) during
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SSME startup and ET GH2 vent arm retraction; ET twang; vapor from the TSM T-0 umbilical
disconnect areas at liftoff; multiple pieces of light colored flame duct debris were visible at
liftoff; acoustic waves were noted in the SRB exhaust cloud; debris in the exhaust cloud at the
pad after liftoff; multiple light colored pieces of debris (possibly RCS paper) aft of the vehicle in
the SSME plume during and after roll maneuver; ET aft dome outgassing; vapor from the SRB
stiffener rings after liftoff; charring of the ET aft dome during ascent; overshoot and adjustment
of roll maneuver; debris in the SSME plume from liftoff through the roll maneuver; sun glint off
the Orbiter windows during roll maneuver; white flashes near the SRB plume; expansion waves;
condensation around the SLV after the roll maneuver; dark puffs in SRB exhaust prior to SRB
separation; SRB plume brightening; and slag debris in the SRB exhaust plume during and after
SRB separation.
MLP events seen were fixed service structure (FSS) deluge water spray activation; mobile launch
platform (MLP) water dump activation; water leak from an MLP J-pipe.
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I • INTRODUCTION
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-62, the sixteenth
flight of the Orbiter Columbia occurred on March 4, 1994, at
approximately 7:53 A.M. Central Standard Time from Launch
Complex 39B (LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida.
Extensive photographic and video coverage exists and has been
evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and flight
hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are
located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard the vehicle, and
uprange and downrange tracking sites.
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
!
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis
objectives for STS-62 included, but were not limited to the
following:
a. Overall facility and shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems
c. Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB
separation time
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS)
integrity
e. Correct operation of the following:
i. Holddown post blast covers
2. SSME ignition
3. LH2 and LO2 17" disconnects
4. GH2 umbilical
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals
6. Free hydrogen ignitors
7. Vehicle clearances
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back
9. Vehicle motion
There was one special test objective for this mission:
i. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation•
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT:
Film was received from fifty-six of fifty-six requested
cameras as well as video from eleven of twenty-three requested
cameras. The following table illustrates the camera data
received at MSFC for STS-62.
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Camera data received at MSFC
for STS-62
MLP
FSS
Perimeter
Tracking
Onboard
16mm 35mm 70mm Video
22 0 0 1
7 0 0 0
3 3 0 1
0 16 0 9
3 2 0 0
Totals 35 21 0 11
Total number of films'and videos received: 67
An individual motion picture camera assessment is provided
as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments of the
video products received at MSFC.
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
All films of the STS-62 launch were of excellent quality.
Lighting conditions at the time of launch were optimum. Little
or no distortion was apparent due to the atmospheric conditions
except for the extreme long-range cameras both north and south
of the flight path. All requested cameras operated properly
except for camera E-I and E-15 which jammed during operation but
provided the required data. Several video products from the
T+45 minute engineering playbacks were not recorded at MSFC
Building 4207 during the downlink. Television operations
personnel have made assurances that this failure will not happen
on future missions. Reports from JSC and KSC engineering
photographic groups show no anomalies or issues from these
cameras.
l b. Onboard Camera Assessment:
Each SRB forward skirt contained a camera to record the
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly. The
l films did not record water impact. A 35mm camera washand-held
used to record film for evaluating the ET TPS integrity after ET
separation. Thirty-six excellent frames of the external tank
l were recorded. Additionally a hand-held camcorder recorded the
external tank during the same time period and acquired
approximately i0 minutes of good quality video. Two 16mm
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motion picture camera and one 35mm still camera were flown on
this mission in the orbiter's umbilical well to record the SRB
and ET separation. One 16mm camera failed to operate.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
a. General Observations:
While viewing the film, several events were noted which
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and
falling as the vehicle lifts off, debris north of MLP ejected
from SRB blast holes, debris induced streaks in the SSME plume,
ice falling from the 17 inch disconnects and umbilicals, and
debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent, which
consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detection paper and
purge barrier material. Body flap and inboard right elevon
motions were noted during ascent.
An unusual debris object was noted from the left SRB main
parachute camera after frustrum separation. The source of this
debris is unknown. Figure 1 shows this debris from camera
E-302.
b. APU Exhaust Port Dripping
Liquid drops were visible from the right SRB APU exhaust
port prior to liftoff. This event occurred approximately five
times. The source of this liquid is unknown. This event can be
seen in Figure 2.
c. Frost on ME-2 Eyelid
Frost was observed around the ME-2 eyelid and on the LOX
overboard drain line prior to engine start. This frost is
visible in Figure 3. Frost around the eyelid was also visible
on STS-60.
d. Glowing Debris from SRB Plume
Multiple pieces of glowing debris appeared to be ejected
from the SRM plume during ascent between T+67 and T+76 seconds.
This event was recorded by camera E-220 as shown in Figure 4.
Typically this type debris is more visible during night sky
conditions and not as evident during day time launches.
e. Main Parachute Rip
A rip in one main parachute was observed at deployment on
the right SRB. No indication of the failure occurring was
evident. This rip did not appear to propagate during descent.
This rip can be seen in Figure 5.
f. ET TPS Divot
v
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A long (approximately 4 x 18") divot was noted forward of
the left bipod strut at the base of the ramp. Green primer is
visible inside the divot. Figure 6 shows this divot as recorded
by the 35mm umbilical well camera.
V. ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times are determined from cameras that view the SRB
holddown posts numbers M-I, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
HOLDDOWN POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I E-9
M-2 E-8
M-5 E-12
M-6 E-13
63:13:53:00.018
63:13:53:00.019
63:13:53:00.018
63:13:53:00.017
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined
to be approximately 31 inches. Figure 7 is a data plot showing
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and
vertical directions. A positive horizontal displacement
represents motion in the -Z direction. These data were derived
from film camera E-79.
c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-62 was determined to be
63:13:55:06.33 UTC as recorded by several tracking cameras.
!
I
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Figure i: Debris Object from Camera E-302
Figure 2: APU Exhaust Port Dripping
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Figure 3: Frost on ME-2 Eyelid and Drain Line
F_gure 4: Glowing Debris from SRB Plume
123
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Figure 5: Main Parachute Rip
Figure 6: ET TPS Divots
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Appendix C. Rockwell Photographic Analysis Summary
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ROCKWELL ENGINEERING PHOTOGRAPHIC
ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT FOR STS-62
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated to
determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) providing this
coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39B Fixed Service Structure (FSS), Mobile
Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and uprange and downrange tracking
sites for the STS-62 launch conducted on March 4, 1994, at 5:53 a.m. PST/GMT
063:13:53:00.009 from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and for the landing on March
18, 1994 at KSC at 5:09 a.m. PST/GMT 077:13:09:41. Rockwell received launch films
from 82 cameras (58 cine, 24 video) and landing films from 29 cameras (15 cine, 14
video) to support the STS-62 photographic evaluation effort.
Overall, the films showed STS-62 to _ a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from the
ET/Orbiter umbilical were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to the Orbiter
Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual condensation and water
vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB stiffener rings and dissipated after the
completion of the roll maneuver. Charring of the ET aft dome, recirculation and
brightening of the SRB plumes were normal. Booster Separation Motor (BSM) ftring and
SRB separation also appeared to be normal.
Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge water was
activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were activated at approximately 1
second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal. All blast deflection shields closed
prior to direct SRB exhaust plume impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and
retracted as designed. The ET GH 2 vent line carrier dropped normally and latched
securely with a slight rebound. No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LH 2
umbilical hydrogen dispersal system hardware.
STS-62 was the twenty-first flight with the optimized attach link in the SRB holddown
support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). No holddown post hangups were
observed.
No major or significant events were observed or identified. Events noted by the Rockwell
film/video users during the review and analysis of the STS-62 photographic items are summarized
in the following comments. There events are not considered to be a constraint to next flight.
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COMMENTS
° On Cameras OTV-163, OTV-170, OTV-071, E-2, E-3, E-15, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-
76 and E-77, orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was noted below the
SSME bells prior to ignition. This vapor has been observed on previous flights and
no follow-on work is scheduled.
.. On cameras E-19 and E-20, a frost line was noted at the base of the SSME #2
nozzle prior to SSME ignition. Frost/ice buildup has been seen on previous flights.
No follow-up action is planned.
. A flash was observed in the SSME #1 plume at SSME ignition (camera E-3).
Flashes in the SSME plumes have been seen on previous missions. No follow-up
action is planned.
. On camera E-17, a thin rectangular piece of light colored debris (possibly a parts
tag) was seen falling from the L02 TSM umbilical lines after SSME ignition, the
debris did not appear to strike the _;ehicle. No follow-up action is planned.
. Small pieces of white debris (ET/ORB umbilical ice) noted between the SRB's
traveling toward the SSME flame duct on camera's E-5 and E-9. One piece
impacted the right SRB aft BSM nozzle prior to SRB ignition (T-2.15 seconds). No
damage to the vehicle was visible. The KSC film analysis team reported that this
piece of ice was from the right SRB/ET aft attach fittings. No follow-up action is
planned.
. On cameras OTV-109, OTV-154, OTV-163, E-5, E-6, E12,E15, E-17, El8, E-25,
E-26 and E-31, normal ice debris was seen falling from the LH 2 and LO 2
ET/Orbiter umbilical disconnect area at SSME ignition through liftoff. Several of
these particles contacted the LH 2 umbilical sill, but no damage was detected. No
follow-up action is planned.
. A thin rectangular piece of red colored debris (probably tape) fell from the SRB aft
skirt below the holddown post M-5 foot into the flame duct at liftoff (cameras EX3
and E-12). No follow-up action has been requested.
. Debris was observed falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle (SLV) at liftoff, during
the roll maneuver and on ascent from camera's KTV-4B, OTV-161, OTV-163, E-
40, E-52, E-54, E-57, E-59, E-65, E-79, E-212, E213, E-220 and E-222. Most of
the debris noted were RCS paper covers or ice from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals.
Other debris items observed were: 1) several pieces of orange - colored debris
(probably umbilical baggie material) near the ET aft dome (OTV-161, E-40, E-79);
2) an orange - colored piece of debris from the ET/Orbiter LH 2 umbilical area falling
aft (E-57) and identified by KSC as hydrogen titre detection butcher paper from the
ET LH 2 vertical strut; and 3) numerous pieces of light - colored debris (probably
forward RCS paper covers) falling aft along the SRB plume during ascent between
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.20 to 68 seconds MET (KTV-4B, E-54, E-59, E-212, E-213, E-222).
debris appeared to impact the vehicle. No follow-up action is planned.
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None of the
On cameras KTV-21B, E-52, E-204, E-205, E-207, E-218, E-220, E-222 and E-
223, several flares were observed in the SSME plumes during ascent. Flares have
been noted on previous missions. No follow-up action is planned.
10. A white vapor cloud was seen near the SRB plume at 57 seconds MET on cameras
E-211, E-222 and E-224, and was possibly caused by the vehicle traveling through a
moisture layer in the atmosphere. Comparison of the rawinsonde data to the
trajectory data by JSC concluded that the vapors were due to a layer of moisture at
9.9 km. A vapor cloud was noted on the STS-48 mission. No follow-up action is
planned.
11. Several orange flashes were noted in the SRB plume prior to plume brightening and
SRB separation (E-204, E-212, E-218). This event has previously been observed on
STS-53 and MSFC personnel indicated at that time that the event was not
anomalous. No follow-on work is _urrently scheduled.
12. The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed on
STS-62. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for information
only:
• Ice debris falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area
• Debris (Insta-foam, water trough) in the holddown post area
and MLP
• Charring of the ET aft dome
• ET aft dome outgassing after liftoff
• RCS Paper debris
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gasses at the aft end of
the SLV prior to SRB separation
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME
start-up
• Twang motion
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure
(MAX-Q) region which appeared to have an amplitude and
frequency similar to those of previous mL,,sions
• Linear optical distortion, possibly caused by shock waves or
ambient meteorological conditions near the vehicle, during
ascent
• Slag in SRB plume after separation
• Vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff
• Fore-and aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster at engine start-up
• Condensation on the Orbiter forward fuselage, ET nose
frustums during ascent.
and SRB
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Camera E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent clearance
separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the falling ET umbilical
structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety.
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances between the left
SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films showed nominal
launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies were observed for the SRB
body trajectory.
Cameras E7-16-OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.020 requires
analysis of ftlm data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to verify nozzle to holddown post
drift clearance.
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No anomalies were
observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive clearances between the SRB
nozzles and the holddown posts were verified.
'
The landing of STS-62 occurred on Runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility.
Good video and film coverage were obtained. Main landing gear touchdown
occurred at 077:13:09:41 GMT and nose landing gear touchdown occurred at
077:13:10:00 GMT with wheel stop occurring at 077:13:10:35 GMT. Review of
the landing videos from the infrared cameras (EL-17, EL-18) showed four pieces of
debris falling from the vehicle at nose landing gear deployment. Two of the items
appeared to originate from the main gear doors and the other two items from the
nose gear area. During the post landing inspection a piece of comer tile (4"x 4") and
six thermal barriers (total size approximately 36"x3"xl.5") were missing from the
nose landing gear doors (NLGD). These objects were probably the debris seen on
the infrared views falling from the Orbiter when the NLGD were opened on final
approach. No follow-up action is planned.
The review of the landing videos and films also showed the Orbiter move to the right
of the runway centerline at 5 seconds after main landing gear (MLG) touchdown and
to the left of the centerline at 8 seconds. No steering changes were visible 14
seconds after MLG touchdown. No follow-up action is planned.
The flight marked the fourteenth use of the Orbiter drag chute. The drag parachute
system performed as expected. All sequenced events occurred as expected and no
hardware anomalies were observed.
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